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Moral Rights Protection in the United 
States Under the Berne Convention: A 
Fictional Work? 
Natalie C. Suhl* 
INTRODUCTION 
The American market is an irresistible magnet for creators from 
around the globe.  Whether a creators medium is the written word, 
oil paints, performance, or music, she wants to profit from the large 
U.S. market.  In recent years the Internet has significantly increased 
entry points into the U.S. market.  The lack of strong protection for 
authors in the American legal tradition, however, presents significant 
reasons for a creator to avoid entering the U.S. market.1 
Although Continentals2 and Americans share a similar early 
history of revolutionary independence, fundamental differences in 
these revolutions established divergent legal traditions.3  In France, 
the overthrow of the landed gentry from below led to the creation of 
a new standard for the elite.4  Intellectual and creative prowess 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., College of Social 
Studies, Wesleyan University, 1996.  I would like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his 
guidance on this project.  Special thanks to Kevin Galbraith, Michael Hartmere, and Daniel 
Branower for their thoughtful editing.  I would also like to thank my parents for their 
invaluable support.  This is for my grandfather. 
 1 See infra Part III. 
 2 France will be the prototype for Continentals in this Comment. 
 3 See ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 138 
(Stuart Gilbert trans., Anchor Books 1st ed. 1955) (de Toqueville notes that in 
English/Anglo society men of letters, historically played a pivotal role in public life.  In 
contrast, the men of letters in France, the intellectuals, did not hold any recognized place in 
French society until the late eighteenth century. In a nation teeming with officials none of 
the men of letters held posts of any kind, none was invested with authority.). 
 4 See id. at 146-47.  Our men of letters did not merely impart their revolutionary ideas 
to the French nation; they also shaped the national temperament and outlook on life. . . .  
The result was that our writers ended up by giving the French man the instincts, the turn of 
mind, the tastes, and even the eccentricities characteristic of the literary man.  And when the 
time came for action, these literary propensities were imported into the political [legal] 
arena. 
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replaced acreage as the basis of power in the new regime.5  In 
contrast, the American Revolution was not a revolution from below, 
but rather an overthrow of an external governing authority by those 
already in power.  The power base in the United States was 
multifaceted; it did not derive from one element such as the 
educational elite or landed gentry, rather the government and 
individuals gained power by meeting the diverse needs of a dynamic 
and socially mobile society.6  American social construction served to 
help expand commercial interests as the country prospered, 
capitalizing upon its social and physical resources.7  In contrast to the 
Continent, artistic pursuits were not perceived as adding any value to 
the countrys well being, and thus were afforded minimal legal 
protection.8 
Part II of this note presents an overview of the Moral Rights 
doctrine and discusses the historical and theoretical development of 
the doctrine9 in Europe and under the Berne Convention.  Part III 
examines the regimes by which U.S. law protects Moral Rights and 
supposedly complies with the Berne Convention.    Part IV concludes  
 
 5 See id. 
 6 In America most of the rich men were formerly poor; most of those who now enjoy 
leisure were absorbed in business during their youth; the consequences of this is that when 
they might have had a taste for study, they had no time for it, and when the time is at their 
disposal, they have no longer the inclination.  1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 52 (Phillips Bradley trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1990). 
 7 In democratic countries, where money does not lead those who possess it to political 
power, but often removes them from it, the rich do not know how to spend their leisure.  
They are driven into active life by the disquietude and the greatness of their desires, by the 
extent of their resources, and by the taste for what is extraordinary, which is almost always 
felt by those who rise, by whatever means, above the crowd.  Trade is the only road open to 
them.  In democracies nothing is greater or more brilliant than commerce. . . .  Those who 
live in the midst of democratic fluctuations have always before their eyes the image of 
chance; and they end by liking all undertakings in which chance plays a part.  They are 
therefore all led to engage in commerce, not only for the sake of profit it holds out to them, 
but for the love of the constant excitement occasioned by that pursuit.  2 ALEXIS DE 
TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 155-56 (Phillips Bradley trans., Vintage Books 1st 
ed. 1990). 
 8 Primary instruction is within the reach of everybody; superior instruction is scarcely 
to be obtained by any. . . .  There is no class, then, in America, in which the taste for 
intellectual pleasure is transmitted with hereditary fortune and leisure and by which the 
labors of intellect are held in honor.  See 1 DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 52. 
 9 See infra note 12. 
FRMT6.SUHL 6/23/02  4:26 PM 
2002] MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1205 
 
that it is questionable if the U.S. is meeting its Moral Rights 
obligations as a signatory to the Berne Convention. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Overview 
During the creation of a work an author maintains a connection to 
the work; essentially, the creation is part of the authors personality 
until the work becomes subject to public judgment.10  The Moral 
Rights of an author11 protect the connection between the creative 
work and the authors vested interest in the work both during and 
after its creation.12  A work becomes subject to public judgment once 
it enters the public domain, which occurs when the work is put up for 
display or is published.13  In the public domain the work is subject to 
the process of transactions.14  Although at this point the artist no 
longer possesses the work, the Moral Rights doctrine provides the 
author with a bundle of vested rights that nonetheless remain.15 
In the most expansive form, Moral Rights provide the author with 
the right to: 1)  (attribution) have her name associated with all her 
creations and no others; 2) (integrity) prevent mutilation, distortion 
or alteration of the art; 3) (disclosure) choose if and when his work 
will be revealed to the public; 4) (retraction or withdrawal) withdraw 
 
 10 See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A 
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 361, 365-66 (1998). 
 11 In this note author refers to the creator of an artistic medium in any medium. 
 12 Many authoritative articles exist on the subject of Moral Rights.  See Thomas F. 
Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.REV. 1 (1997); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act 
and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 477 (1990). 
 13 See Swack, supra note 10, at 365. 
 14 See id. (the work becomes the subject of transactions as it is bought and sold within 
the commercial market; therefore, the author gives up control over the works physical 
nature). 
 15 See id. at 365-66. 
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his work once revealed.16  The scope of Moral Rights protection, 
however, varies among legal regimes.17 
B. General History 
1. Impact of the Renaissance 
Until the middle of the Renaissance, the Catholic Church and 
wealthy patrons overarched artists creativity in Europe and 
England.18  As the Churchs influence decreased, artistic innovation 
and expression burgeoned.19  The expansion of artists creativity 
fostered the momentum for the assertion of artists personal rights.20  
Michelangelo, capitalizing upon his outstanding reputation, first 
demanded the bundle of rights that now fall under the umbrella of 
Moral Rights.21  In a sculpture commissioned for a chapel in St. 
Peters Cathedral, Michelangelo, first asserting his right of 
attribution, secretly chiseled his name into the sculpture after hearing 
of the sculpture being falsely attributed to his patron.22 Later, 
Michelangelo asserted his right of disclosure while finishing the 
ceiling of the Sistine chapel, by refusing Pope Julius II access to the 
unfinished murals.23 
 
 16 See id. 
 17 See generally Adolf Dietz, The Moral Rights of the Author: Moral Rights and the 
Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995) (discussing the scope of 
Moral Rights in Europe); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights 
and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229 (1995) (presenting the 
scope of Moral Rights in England and the United States). 
 18 See Swack, supra note 10, at 367 (citing Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of 
Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I  From the Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6 
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975)). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE PAINTERS, SCULPTORS AND ARCHITECTS (AB 
Hinds ed. 1927). 
 23 See id. 
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The vision behind the right of integrity can also be attributed to 
Michelangelo.24  Under the patronage system, the artist executed the 
patrons idea.25  Michelangelo realized that artists integrity would be 
perpetually violated until they were able to exercise creative control 
over their works.26  Although fulfilling lucrative commissions, 
Michelangelo leveraged his reputation by creating paintings to 
satisfy his own creative instincts, knowing that his reputation would 
afford him a buyer.27  Michelangelo fundamentally redefined the 
patron-artist relationship by transforming the artist into the one 
determining subject, style, and price.28 
2. Invocation of Official Authors Rights 
In the eighteenth century French authors adopted a natural law 
conception of rights in their creations, protesting the royal printing 
privileges.29  The French Revolution provided the impetus for 
statutory recognition of the natural law theory of copyright, which 
replaced the royal printing monopoly.30 The Revolutionary Laws of 
January 13-19, 1791, codified inherent, exclusive rights of authors in 
their works.31 
Respect for the natural law basis of authors rights began to 
diminish in the 1880s.32  Societal shifts created a disconnect between 
 
 24 See Swack, supra note 10, at 369. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 775, 791 
(1990) (The notion of artistic property appeared in France during the Eighteenth Century 
with in the context of the struggle of authors against the system of royal privileges.  Such 
privileges were mostly granted by the king to publishing companies in Paris.  Authors 
claimed the right to sell their manuscripts to editors of their choice or even to edit and print 
documents themselves. . . .  This property right implied the right to sell their products to 
whomever they wanted.  These claims reflected the general aversion among Eighteenth 
Century intellectuals to the royal control on intellectual production.). 
 30 See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986, at 5-6 (1987). 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
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the public and intellectuals.33  In addition, many rejected the natural 
law analogy, asserting that it diminished the presence of individual 
personality within a work.34  To reinvigorate the respect for and basis 
of authors rights, French jurists turned to the theories of inalienable 
personality and alienable property, delineated in the writings of the 
German philosophers Kant and Hegel.35 
3. Influence of the Germans upon Modern Moral Rights 
An authors creation, according to Kant, is a manifestation of the 
individuals will.36 The rights that an author maintains in his works 
according to Kant, then, are personality rather than property rights.37  
In Kants worldview, a bright line exists between the tangible 
material elements of an authors work and the expression inherent 
within the work; essentially, the inherent personal expression 
dominates the material component of the work.38  In contrast to 
property, which is a means of exchanging value, an authors creation 
is a means of exchanging thought.39  Within Kants theory rests the 
notion that personality rights are a derivative of every mans 
inalienable right to express and communicate his ideas.40 Hegel 
asserts that the development of personality occurs through the 
externalization of its will, thereby allowing property to be deemed 
an expression of self.41 
In the late nineteenth century three German philosophers built 
upon the theories of Kant and Hegel, creating the theoretical basis for 
 
 33 See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy 
in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 26 
(1994). 
 34 See id. at 16. 
 35 See id. at 17-20. 
 36 See Swack, supra note 10, at 371-72 (quoting Was is ein Buch, where Kant states that 
an authors vision is an action, an exertion of the [artists] will, rather than an external 
thing). 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See Swack, supra note 10, at 371. 
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the modern doctrine of Moral Rights.42  Karl Gareis, a Kantian, 
reinvigorated the concept of personality rights toward the latter half 
of the nineteenth century.  Personality rights, according to Gareis, 
were comprised of the personality itself.43 
Otto Friedrick von Gierke, elaborating upon Kantian philosophy, 
asserted that personality rights were separate, distinct, and superior 
to authors rights.44  Personality rights protect the author and all 
concrete manifestations of the authors will, while authors rights 
concern only the economic exploitation of the artistic property.45  
Therefore, in von Gierkes worldview, aspects of a creative work 
expressing the artists personality should dominate the financial 
interests of the work. 
John Kohler, a follower of Hegel, developed the dualist theory of 
authors rights at the start of the twentieth century.46 The dualist 
theory asserts that artists maintain both personality and economic 
interests in their works; however, each area is protected under 
separate bundles of legal rights.47  Through the creative process an 
artist transmits a piece of herself into the work, thereby also allowing 
her to economically exploit the monetary value created by this 
manifestation of the artists personality.48  Kohler, in accord with von 
Gierke, emphasized that an artistic work is predominantly a 
reflection of the artist and that the personality rights, therefore, must 
take precedence over the economic components.49 
Modern French copyright law, in particular, the French droit 
dauteur in article 2 of the French Act, is a reflection of the dualist 
theory.50  Under the French Act the author receives exclusive rights 
 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of 
Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 167 (1994). 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?  The Philosophy 
of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 817, 841-42 (1990). 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Loi du 11 Mars 1957 Sur la Propriete Litteraire et Artistique, arts. 26-28, 1957 
J.O. 2733, 1957 D.L. 102 (Fr.) [hereinafter French Act] (translated in UNESCO, 1 
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in his or her creation, which are divided into economic and Moral 
Rights.51 The split of droit dauteur can be deemed dualist due to the 
differing status accorded to economic and Moral Rights.52  Economic 
rights are of a limited duration and are assignable.53  In contrast, 
Moral Rights are infinite in duration, imprescriptible, and 
inalienable.54  The power of moral over economic rights, however, is 
not weaker because of this split.55 In reality, and in contrast to the 
U.S., Moral Rights exert an inextricable force upon the economic 
nature of a work, restricting the extent of ownership in an intellectual 
work by someone other than the author.56 
4. Initial Applications of Moral Rights 
The French courts were the first to accept Moral Rights as a valid 
legal term of art.57  In 1878 a prominent French jurist, Andre 
Morillot, invoked the phrase Moral Rights in the case of Cinquin c. 
Lecocq before the Cour de Cassation, Frances highest court.58  The 
issue in Cinquin c. Lecocq was whether or not property rights of a 
copyright were community property between spouses.59  Despite 
answering the question affirmatively, the court allowed the artist-
husband to retain his right to change the works or even suppress 
them.60 
The concept of authors rights upon which Morillot based his idea 
is rooted in the dualist system of protection espoused by Hegel and 
developed by Kohler.61  Morillots invocation of Moral Rights 
 
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATISES OF THE WORLD (1987)). 
 51 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 23. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See French Act, supra note 50, art. 30. 
 54 See French Act, supra note 50, art. 6., para. 2. 
 55 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 23. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See Swack, supra note 10, at 372. 
 58 See Judgment de 25 Juin 1902 (Cinquin C. Lecocq), Civ., 1903 Recueil Periodique 
Siery [D.P.] 1.5. 
 59 See William Strauss, Moral Rights of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 513 n.31 
(1955). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See Edward Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the 
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provided the author complete personal sovereignty, while 
opposing all publication against the will of the author, all 
publication under a name other than the true creator, and all vicious 
and inexact reproduction.62  Further, Morillots system granted the 
right of economic exploitation exclusively to the author.63 
Following this initial acknowledgement of Moral Rights in 
Cinquin c. Lecocq, the French Bar argued over whether to adopt 
Kants monist system in lieu of Hegels dualist system, under which 
Cinquin c. Lecocq was argued.64  Under the Monists system authors 
rights are non-specific personality rights.65  In contrast, Dualists 
perceived authors rights as two distinct rights: the right to 
economically exploit ones creative property and the 
acknowledgment that an authors work is a direct manifestation of 
his or her personality.66  The French jurists chose Dualism, as the 
two elements provided a clearer, more tangible legal test.67  Dualism 
provided the French courts with a means of resolving disputes 
regarding authors rights by a transparent inductive process.68  Other 
European systems chose to guard authors rights through a more 
opaque deductive process.69 
5. Article 6bis of The Berne Convention 
The Moral Rights provision of article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(hereinafter Article 6bis) was adopted at the Rome Convention of 
1928.70  Article 6bis encompasses both the right of attribution and 
 
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Swack, supra note 10, at 373. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Damich, supra note 61, at 31. 
 68 See id. 
 69 The German legal system follows the Kantian monist view of authors rights.  The 
deontelogical influenced German legal regime chose to philosophically justify a general 
personality right and the derivative rights through a deductive process in contrast to the 
French system, which affirmatively protects authors rights.  See id at 30-31. 
 70 See International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
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the right of integrity.71 The right of attribution defined by Article 
6bis as the right to claim authorship of the work.72  This broad 
wording encompasses the right to have a work published 
anonymously or under a pseudonym, to prevent false attribution, and 
the right to prevent the authors name from being applied to the work 
of another person.73 Specifically, Article 6bis states: 
Independently of the authors economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have 
the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to 
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
another derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.74 
Technically, then, all signatories of the Berne Convention must 
recognize artists Moral Rights. 
The United States would not join the Berne Convention for 
approximately a century.  In 1988, however, the United States 
became a signatory of the Berne Convention, on a conditional basis, 
through the Berne Implementation Act.75  Congress did not include 
new provisions recognizing moral Moral Rights in the Berne 
Implementation Act.  Rather, Congress asserted that American law 
 
Proceedings of the Conference Held at Rome from May 7 to June 2 1928, Vol. 1 at 106-07, 
Vol. 2 at 173-82, 200-04 (Pierre Tisseyre trans., 1929) [hereinafter Rome Conference]. 
 71 See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 455, 467-69. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Final Report on the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, 10 COL.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 514 (1986). 
 74 See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 455 (citing the first section of article 6bis of the 
Paris Act of the Berne Convention). 
 75 The Berne Implementation Act [hereinafter the Act] dictates the execution of the 
Berne Convention, and holds that the domestic law will overarch US obligations under the 
Berne Convention.  Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(1), (2) 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).  In particular, § 
3(b) of the Act clearly rejects Moral Rights: 
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the US thereto, and the 
satisfaction of US obligations there under, do not expand or reduce any right of an 
author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or common lawto claim 
authorship of the work; or to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would 
prejudice the authors honor or reputation. 
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already protected authors Moral Rights adequately through the areas 
of unfair competition, copyright, contract, defamation, and privacy.76  
In addition, American federal courts refuse to allow Article 6bis to 
provide a cause of action for Moral Rights violations.77  Thus, the 
U.S. joined the Berne Convention to ease international criticism, 
while bowing to domestic pressure by avoiding direct protection of 
Moral Rights through a recycled argument of indirect protection.78 
III. MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Background 
Copyright law in the U.S. is a reflection of a utilitarian tradition.79 
In contrast, Continental copyright law is a derivative of natural rights 
and German idealism.80  Social utility is the driving force behind 
American copyright law.81  In the tradition of American utilitarian 
 
 76 Existing and parallel American laws, according to the House of Representatives, 
already provided protection for Moral Rights: 
There is a composite of laws in this country that provides the kind of protection 
envisioned by Article 6bis.  Federal laws include 17 U.S.C. §106, relating to 
derivative works; 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2), relating to distortions of musical works 
used under the compulsory license respecting sound recording; 17 U.S.C §203, 
relating to termination of transfers and licenses; and section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, relating to false designations of origin and false descriptions.  State and local 
laws include those relating to publicity, contractual violations, fraud and 
misrepresentation, unfair competition, defamation, and invasion of privacy.  In 
addition, eight states have recently enacted specific statutes protecting the right of 
integrity and paternity in certain works of art.  Finally, some courts have 
recognized the equivalent of such rights.  See H.R. REP. NO. 609, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 32-34 (1988). 
 77 See Choe v. Fordham University School of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (holding that the Convention itself, as adopted, does not create federal common law 
action for violation of authors moral rights (citing to MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT section 8D.02[D], 8d-15-30 (1994)). 
 78 See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940). 
 79 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 9 n.29. 
 80 See discussion supra Part II. 
 81 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (the 
limited monopoly . . . should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public 
appropriate access to their work product). 
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liberalism, authors rights are deemed to be monopoly privileges 
and are granted only to advance the public welfare by providing 
incentive for creativity, the product of which will be widely 
available.82 Specifically, the United States Constitution states that: 
Congress shall have the Power . . . to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.83  As a result, copyright law in the U.S. functions as a 
tool for the public interest rather than a guaranteed right arising out 
of creation.84 
The level and type of protection afforded to creative works by U.S. 
law is a reflection of its market-dominated political economy.85  In 
Continental legal systems, intellectual and creative works are 
manifestations of the culture.86  Conversely, the same works in the 
United States are another commodity for the market.87  The social 
utility of a creative work is not measured by its contribution to 
society or its novelty; rather, the social utility of the work and its 
value to the author derives primarily from the price that the public is 
willing to pay for the work.88  The greatest proponent of the free 
market, Adam Smith, praised the monopoly for authors under the 
Statute of Anne.  Smith asserted that: [I]f the book be a valuable 
one the demand for it in [the copyright period] will probably be a 
considerable addition to the [the authors] fortune.  But if it is of no 
value the advantage he can reap for it will be very small.89  Until 
recently, then, American copyright sought solely to maximize 
economic incentives for production and reduce incentives such as 
 
 82 See id. 
 83 U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8.  This section of the U.S. constitution is often referred to 
as the Copyright Clause or the Intellectual Property Clause. 
 84 The conception of copyright as a means of serving the public good is clearly 
articulated in the enabling clause of the United States Constitution art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
 85 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 11.  The Utilitarian model of economic incentive to 
stimulate author production and publisher dissemination presupposes a private-property 
based milieu in which authors and publishers rewards are determined in the marketplace. 
 86 See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 5-6. 
 87 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 12. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 13 quoting Adam Smith, Lecture on Jurisprudence 83 
(R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, P.G. Stein eds., Glasgow ed. 1978). 
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prestige and creative desire; more specifically, American copyright 
law sought market efficiency not protection of authors rights.90  
Moral Rights are not being explicitly protected for the author; rather, 
Moral Rights are being protected for the benefit of the market.  In 
light of this tradition, it is evident why Moral Rights conflict with the 
market-dominated culture of U.S. law. 
B. VARA 
Two years after signing onto the Berne Convention, Congress 
softened its prohibition of explicit Moral Rights protection.  In 1994 
Congress codified the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter 
VARA),91 which grants a bundle of Moral Rights to a limited 
group of visual artists.92  Unfortunately, though, VARA narrowly 
defines work of visual art, and therefore is invoked only in very 
limited circumstances.93 
 
 90 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 327-28 (1989) (stating that works will be created only if the 
difference between expected revenues and the cost of making copies equals or exceeds the 
cost of expression). 
 91 Visual Artists Rights Act [hereinafter VARA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 
5128 (1990)) (codified in part in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 
(1994)). 
 92 VARA states that creative artists: 
(1) shall have the right (A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the 
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did 
not create; (2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the 
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation; and (3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have 
the right(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work 
is a violation of that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of 
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 93 To date, limited VARA claims are on record.  See English v. BFC & R East 11th 
Street LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3. 1997), affd, 198 F.3d 
233 (2d. Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Pavia v. 
1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates, 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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C. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
1. Definitions and Origins 
The Lanham Act serves to combat false advertising and the 
inappropriate use of trademarks.94  The purpose of the Lanham Act is 
to aid consumers by preventing a marketplace of unfair 
competition.95 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (hereinafter § 43(a)) prohibits 
the utilization of incorrect statements in regards to the origin, 
description, or patronage of a product.96  Essentially § 43(a) 
intervenes against action that could lead to consumer confusion.97  
Section 43(a) serves the consumer by guarding against 
misinformation streaming into the market, allowing the consumer to 
benefit from the markets natural, spontaneous order.98  The first to 
benefit from § 43(a), however, are players and producers in the 
marketplace.99  A competitor, for example, may sue under § 43(a) to 
 
 94 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending §§ 1052 and 1127). 
 95 See Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, Artists, and Performers Under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 45 (1993) (referring to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)). 
 96 15 USC § 1125(a) (1992).  It states: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services or any container 
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which  is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person, or in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
persons goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action 
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an 
act. 
 97 See Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution 
under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45 (1995). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
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prevent false advertising by the defendant.100  Therefore, although 
consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of § 43(a), producers of 
goods and services in the marketplace are generally the first parties 
to invoke § 43(a).101  In recent years, authors have invoked § 43(a) to 
protect their rights of attribution and integrity.102 
2. Reverse Passing Off: Right of Attribution under § 43(a) 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as stated above, regulates two 
types of activities: 1) false advertising; and 2) the passing off of 
goods under a competitors trademark.103  Courts invoke the phrase 
passing off in three distinct situations: 1) trademark infringement 
without intent to defraud, but where consumers were likely to be 
confused; 2) trademark infringement with intent to defraud and 
confuse buyers; and 3) substitution of one brand of goods when 
another brand is ordered.104  Overall, though, the main issue concerns 
whether or not the consumer will confuse the two products. 
Section 43(a) is also invoked in many federal circuits to combat 
practices that are the economic equivalent of passing off.  
Essentially, § 43(a) protects the market from misinformation that 
could distort its natural, spontaneous order.105  Included in these acts 
would be reverse passing off, which occurs when the party at fault 
 
 100 See id. 
 101 Compare Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 
1971) (Congress purpose in enacting §43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair 
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) with Sergent, supra note 97, at 46 n.5 (When a court 
expands the Lanhams Acts scope by providing new definitions of unfair practices, the 
ultimate interests of consumers should be the baseline against which to measure whether a 
producer should be given a right under § 43(a).  Producers are often harmed by 
legitimate competition, and if the sole focus of the Lanham Act causes of action is upon the 
producer, the Lanham Act can easily become a tool for reducing or eliminating competition, 
to the consumers ultimate detriment.). 
 102 See Pinover, supra note 95, at 38; see also Marie v. Driscoll, The New 43(a), 79 
TRADEMARK REP. 238 (1989). 
 103 See discussion supra Part III(c)(i). 
 104 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.01(1), at 
25-3 (1994). 
 105 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981). 
FRMT6.SUHL 6/23/02  4:26 PM 
1218 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
sells another partys creation or product as his or her own.106  
Reverse passing off takes shape in two different forms.  Implied 
reverse passing off occurs when the defendant removes the source 
name of a product and sells it in a generic form.107  Express reverse 
passing off takes place when the defendant removes anothers name 
or trademark and then proceeds to sell the product under his or her 
own chosen name or mark.108 
Courts often interpret the prohibition against reverse passing off 
in § 43(a) as providing authors with a legitimate right to seek proper 
credit for their work.109  Two justifications exist for this contention: 
1) if authors do not receive proper credit, consumer confusion will 
result because the consumer will be unaware of the true source of the 
work; and 2) without proper credit, the authors reputation would not 
be enhanced commensurate with the creation.110  It is supposed, then, 
that the author will likely be denied future opportunities if her 
reputation does not accurately reflect her work. 
Authors seek remedy under reverse passing off for claims 
regarding their right of attribution under the Lanham Act.  The 1981 
Ninth Circuit decision of Smith v. Montoro is the leading case on this 
issue.111  Case law following Smith provides authors and other 
creators with the right of attribution.  Although the right of 
attribution is a type of reverse passing off claim, it is not 
conceptually interchangeable with a standard reverse passing off case 
dealing with a manufactured product or a trademark.112  Right of 
attribution claims are more complex, encompassing claims exceeding 
the  creators  physical  product.113     A  creator  asserts  the  right  of  
 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See Sergent, supra note 97, at 46. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an actor maintained standing to sue a 
distributor under § 43(a) because the distributor credited the actors work to someone else in 
the credits). 
 112 See MCCARTHY, supra note 104, § 25.01(4)(b), at 25-10. 
 113 See Sergent, supra note 97, at 51-52 
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attribution when he or she should receive credit for the defendants 
products.114 
3. Demonstrating a Successful § 43(a) Claim 
A successful claim for the right of attribution under section 43(a) 
must satisfy three requirements.  First, to gain jurisdiction, the goods 
and services in question must be involved in interstate commerce.115  
Second, one must successfully prove standing to sue under the 
Lanham Act.116 Standing is achieved when the plaintiff proves either 
a competitive or commercial injury, which maintains a causal link to 
misleading information. Third, the plaintiff must have a genuine 
interest protected by the act.117 
4. Protected Interests of a § 43(a) Right of Attribution Claim 
An authors claim for the right of attribution under § 43(a) cannot 
be solely based upon a false designation of authorship; rather, the 
central claim must be based upon a claim of actual confusion.118 
 
 114 See id. 
 115 See Sims v. Blanchris, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff denied 
standing as defendant never entered goods into an interstate stream of commerce). 
 116 See MCCARTHY, supra note 104, § 27.03(3)(a) (stating that although both the pre- 
and post-1988 versions of section 43(a) give standing to any person who believes that he is 
or is likely to be damaged, courts have not given this provision its full literal scope . . . 
although most courts now agree that direct competition with the wrongdoer is not 
necessary.). 
 117 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1080 (1993). 
 118 See Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (Only 
one of three songwriters was given proper credit.  The Ninth Circuit held that [had] the 
defendants decided to attribute authorship to a fictitious person . . . this would be a false 
designation of origin.  It seems to us no less false to attribute authorship to only one of 
several co-authors.). 
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5. Protected Interests v. Industry Custom 
The standard for determining when an interest is protected under § 
43(a) is not clearly defined by the courts.119  As § 43(a) claims are 
designed to remedy false attribution, courts generally ignore 
substantive law and industry custom when deciding claims under this 
section.120  For instance, where an editor designated herself the 
principal author in accordance with industry custom, a court still 
found it misleading.121 
D. Limitation of Right of Attribution Claims 
The remedies invoked under § 43(a) must correlate with the 
overall purpose of the Lanham Act.122  As noted above, reverse 
passing off cases require that the harm is the product of: 1) the 
original creators loss of future earning potential because the creation 
is being sold under another name, and 2) consumer confusion arising 
from the inability to decipher the correct origin of the product.123 
1. Likelihood of Confusion 
A likelihood of confusion exists where the plaintiff is likely to 
assume that the creation in question originated with the defendant, 
when the plaintiff can actually claim a right of attribution.124  A two-
 
 119 See Sergent, supra note 97, at 58. 
 120 See id. (asserting that the rationale for ignoring other substantive law or industry 
custom is that §43(a) focuses upon false representations, rather than vindication of property 
rights.). 
 121 See Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(holding that industry practices were not pertinent to the case because even if the industry 
practices were to grant attribution rights to the editor, it would still violate the Lanham Act 
if original authors contribution was misrepresented). 
 122 See Sergent, supra note 97, at 62 (referring to Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 
832 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 123 See Smith, 648 F.2d at 607. 
 124 [A] likelihood of confusion should always exist whenever the plaintiff can show a 
right of attribution for the defendants product and consumers do not know that the plaintiff 
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prong test is utilized to determine if a valid right of attribution claim 
exists: 1) a comparison of the two products should be made by the 
court, to determine whether or not the defendant is actually selling 
the plaintiffs product125; and 2) If the court makes an affirmative 
finding in part one, then it should determine if consumers are 
confused about the source of the product.126  Significantly, however, 
the sophistication of the consumer will be taken into account in order 
to determine if the consumer actually knew of the source.127 
2. Actual Confusion 
Actual confusion is shown by a lost future opportunity.128  The 
plaintiff, then, in a reverse passing off case, must show that he or she 
lost future opportunities that would have been available if correct and 
sufficient recognition was given for the creation.129  If, however, that 
cannot be proved, then actual consumer confusion must be proved.130  
In a reverse passing off case, actual consumer confusion occurs when 
the consumers actually believed the defendant to be the originator of 
the creation in question.131 
E. Right of Integrity 
1. Defined 
The Right of Integrity involves the mutilation of an artists work, 
which is defined as substantially changing a creation without the 
 
created the products that the defendant is selling. See Sergent, supra note 97, at 63. 
 125 See id. 
 126 See id. at 63-64. 
 127 See Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236, (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the 
sophisticated nature of the buyers, medical professionals, allowed them to be informed that 
medical treatises are a compilation of prior works.  Therefore, the court found that there was 
not a likelihood of actual confusion). 
 128 See Sergent, supra note 97, at 65. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. 
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authors permission.132  Injury occurs because the author is given 
credit for a work that does not include his final authorization.133 
2. Continental Protection of Integrity 
The Right of Integrity is the central component of Moral Rights 
protection in France.134  Negatively, the right provides the author 
with entitlement to prevent any public presentation of the work that 
threatens his or her reputation.135  The French case involving the 
artist Bernard Buffet is often cited as an example of the French 
Courts respect for and acknowledgement of the negative rights 
inherent in the Right of Integrity.136 Another legitimate invocation of 
the negative right associated with the Right of Integrity is to combat 
an adaptation that does not truthfully represent the work.137  An 
additional invocation of the negative right is justified when a public 
display of a work is detrimental to the works overall conceptual 
view.138  The leading case regarding this third invocation concerned 
the music of Dmitri Shostakovich in an anti-Soviet film without 
Shostakovichs permission.139  Only a French court found in favor of 
the musician.140  The French case Dubuffet c. Renault exemplifies the 
 
 132 See Roeder, supra note 78, at 566. 
 133 See Pinover, supra note 95, at 45. 
 134 See Codified in Article 6 of Loi du 11 mars 1957 Sur la Propiete Litteraire et 
Artsitique, arts.26-28, 1957 J.O. 2733, 1957 D.L. 102 (Fr.), stating that the author shall 
enjoy . . . respect for his name, his authorship, and his work. 
 135 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 38. 
 136 See Judgment of May 30, 1962 (Fersing v. Buffet), Cour de Cassation, 1965 G.P. 126 
(Buffet had painted designs on a refrigerator, which the owner sought to dismantle and sell 
as individual pieces.  Buffet sued to prevent the refrigerators dismantling and asserted that 
the refrigerator was an artistic whole.  The cour de cassation ruled that the public display of 
Buffets work in the mutilated form would violate the artists personal right in regards to his 
creation, but that the separate pieces could be kept in the owners home.).  See generally 
John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976). 
 137 See Bernard Rousseau v. Galeries Lafayette, Judgment of Mar. 13, 1973, Trib. Gr. 
Inst. 1974 J.C.P., No. 48, at 224; see also Damich, supra note 61, at 22. 
 138 See Damich, supra note 61, at 23. 
 139 See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 87 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1st Dept 
1949) (New York court rejected claim that the unauthorized use of the musicians pieces in 
a film about soviet espionage in Canada, falsely imbued disloyalty to his country). 
 140 See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americain Twentieth 
Century, Judgement of Jan. 13, 1953, 1953 G.P. 191. 
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positive right of integrity; more specifically, when an author can 
demand public presentation of a work.141  In this case the artist was 
commissioned to design a sculpture for Renault, but the company 
defaulted due to financial problems.  The Cour de Cassation ordered 
Renault to finish the sculpture, implicitly asserting that the artist was 
entitled to the preservation of his creation, which in this case meant 
its presentation in tangible form.142  The author in France, and in 
many other Continental regimes, maintains a personal connection 
with his or her creation that extends beyond the authors reputation 
interests; essentially, the author is allowed to intervene whenever he 
or she feels that a modification to a given work may affect the 
publics judgment of the author.143 
3. Gilliam v. ABC: Where It Started 
Under § 43(a), an author may assert his or her right of integrity 
when his or her work is altered without permission.144  The leading 
case regarding this issue is Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,145 
which held that ABCs broadcasting of a highly edited version of 
Monty Python skits violated § 43(a).  In Gilliam, the court found that 
ABCs unauthorized editing substantially changed the skits, allowing 
the public to associate the new skits as Monty Pythons original 
creation.146  Essentially, the court asserted that the presentation of the 
 
 141 See Judgment of Mar. 23, 1977, Trib. Gr. Inst., 1977 R.I.D.A. 191 obs. Desbois (Fr.), 
affd, Judgment of June 2, 1978, 1980 G.P. 580 note Franck, revd, Judgment of Jan. 8, 
1980, Cass. Civ. 1re, 1980 J.C.P. II no. 1933 note Lindon. 
 142 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 39.  See generally Andre Francon & Jane Ginsburg, 
Authors Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned Work to 
Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381 
(1985). 
 143 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 39 (referring to Delorme v. Catena-France, Judgment 
December 12, 1988, Cours d/appel, P.I.B.D. III, NO. 454, at 231, 10 EUROPEAN INTELL. 
PROP. REV. D-182 (1989) where a company logo that the designer created was modified 
without his authorization, the court granted the right of integrity to the designer, even 
though the changes only consisted in the positioning of the logo)). 
 144 This statute . . . has been . . . invoked to prevent misrepresentations that may injure 
plaintiffs business or personal reputation, even where no registered trademark is 
concerned. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Corp., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
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mutilated Monty Python skit violated the right of the artist to have 
the work attributed to him in the form in which he created it.147 
4. Gilliam Applied 
While Gilliam is a landmark on the map of integrity protection in 
the U.S., it is an anomaly.148  The Gilliam holding is problematic as 
precedent because the facts are so unique and represent a clear case 
of mutilation; therefore, many courts who are not inclined to protect 
the right to integrity will distinguish the facts of Gilliam.149 
In the music industry, § 43(a), as applied in Gilliam, is invoked to 
protect the older recordings of musicians from being altered and then 
presented to the public as new albums without permission.150  One 
case, Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.,151 involves the 
remixing of an older artists album, where the new version included 
sexually explicit lyrics and an erotically renamed cover 152  Although 
the defendant created the derivative works and owned copyright in 
the old album, the Southern District of New York still found that 
such unorthodox alterations violated § 43(a).153  Like Gilliam, 
though, this case is overt and extreme. 
 
 147 See id. (court held that to deform [the authors] work is to present [an author] to the 
public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for 
work he has not done.). 
 148 Gilliam has yet to be followed. 
 149 See generally Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Marvullo 
v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 150 See Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of 
Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143, 172 (1997). 
 151 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Defendants remixed one of plaintiffs older 
recording sessions and marketed the material as George Benson, Erotic Moods.  Record 
jacket featured X-Rated LP caption, and sexually suggestive moaning was added to one 
selection.). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. 
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5. The Limits of Gilliam as Precedent for Integrity Protection 
Although Gilliam does represent a standard for protecting the right 
to integrity via the Lanham Act, it does not necessarily provide a true 
remedy because of the onerous standard required for a successful 
claim. To successfully bring a Lanham Act claim for damages, the 
plaintiff must prove either actual consumer confusion or deception in 
addition to the violation of integrity, where the defendants actions 
were not intentionally deceptive.154 Although this standard was 
easily met by the facts of Gilliam, it is rare to find a case where the 
facts will present an irrefutable claim of consumer confusion. 
Gilliam and its descendants represent an expansive reading of § 
43(a) asserting that that the Lanham Acts purpose is not only to 
protect the public and artist from misrepresentations, but also to 
enforce the authors personal right to reject public viewings of his 
or her work in a mutilated or distorted form.155  Many courts, 
however, view this interpretation of the Lanham Act as an illicit 
substitute, or back-door, for Moral Rights protection.156  In fact, the 
majority of recent cases regarding this issue reject the broad 
interpretation of § 43(a) championed in Gilliam. 
6. Why Gilliam Is Likely to Stand Alone 
In the 1995 Southern District of New York case of Choe v. 
Fordham University School of Law,157 the court also struck down the 
plaintiffs claim for Moral Rights relief under § 43(a).158  The 
plaintiff submitted a comment to the Fordham International Law 
 
 154 See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 155 See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24. 
 156 See Judge Gurfeins concurrence in Gilliam, asserting that section 43(a) should not be 
invoked as a moral rights substitute because the Lanham Act does not deal with artistic 
integrity. It only goes to misdescription of origin and the like.  Although not dissenting 
from Judge Lumbards application of section 43(a) to the facts of Gilliam in the majority 
opinion, Judge Gurfein stated that it would have been more prudent to invoke available 
contractual and copyright remedies.  See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26-27. 
 157 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 158 See id. 
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Journal, and claimed that the printed version represented a mutilated 
form of his comment due to the editorial changes.159  The court did 
not overrule Gilliam; rather, it distinguished it and emphasized that 
in this case the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support a claim 
that the changes sufficiently changed the meaning of the piece so as 
to provide the reader with a different meaning of Choes work.160 Of 
greater significance, however, is that the court explicitly struck down 
the validity of an Article 6bis claim for Moral Rights due to lack of 
federal jurisdiction.161  The Choe decision, thus, is representative of 
the rejection by American courts of the explicit Moral Rights 
protection offered under Article 6bis and a reliance upon the weak 
protection afforded under the Berne Implementation Act.162  
Furthermore, the attitude exhibited by the Choe court indicates that 
the overt protection of Moral Rights in Gilliam is not likely to be 
emulated in other decisions.163 
7. Comparative Weakness of Integrity Protection 
The weaknesses and limits of authors integrity protection under 
U.S. law relative to Continental law is highlighted by a case 
involving Turner Entertainments colorization of the black and white 
film, Asphalt Jungle.164  The heirs of the films director protested the 
colorization of the film.165  Under U.S. law, colorization creates a 
derivative work conditioned upon the will of the copyright owners 
exclusive derivative right.166  In this case, though, the heirs did not 
maintain a successful cause of action for U.S. courts, particularly 
because standard film contracts force the director to sign away all 
 
 159 See id. at 45. 
 160 See id. at 48. 
 161 See id. at 49. 
 162 See id. 
 163 See id. (Whatever language there may be in . . . Gilliam to suggest a federal common 
law claim for deprivation of an authors moral rights is dictum, and has not generated any 
claim in this Circuit for almost 20 years.). 
 164 See Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. Civ. 1re, 149 r.i.d.a. 197 (1991); see also 
Ginsburg & Sirinelli, Auteur, Creation et Adaptation en Droit International Prive et Droit 
Iterne Francais.  Reflexions a Partir de lAffaire Huston, 150 R.I.D.A. 2 (1991). 
 165 See Judgment of May 28, 1991, supra note 164. 
 166 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 44. 
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rights to the producer.167  The directors heirs, though, filed suit in 
France to prevent a French television station from broadcasting the 
colorized version, asserting that it would violate the directors Right 
of Integrity.168  In its analysis, the Cour de Cassation refused to 
apply U.S. Copyright law, and ruled under French law that the 
directors creative contribution to a film makes him or her the 
author.169  Under French law, therefore, the director as author 
maintains his Moral Right of Integrity even after the industrys 
standard assignment of rights.170 
The discrepancy between the outcomes in the Asphalt Jungle case 
under U.S. and French law illustrates that U.S. copyright law is 
dominated by economic interests, consistent with U.S. legal 
tradition.171  While successful causes of action for Moral Rights 
protection under § 43(a) do exist in the cases discussed earlier, those 
represent specific causes of action that fall nicely under the rubric of 
unfair competition.172  Moral Rights are not being explicitly 
protected; rather, Moral Rights are being protected for the benefit of 
the market and not the author.  As the Asphalt Jungle case 
demonstrates, the United States does not afford an author a clear or 
consistent means of creative protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Moral Rights protection is limited in the United States, where the 
only viable course of action for non-visual authors is through the 
Lanham Act.  Regarding both the Right of Attribution and the Right 
of Integrity, the Lanham Act provides only limited protection.  The 
prevention of consumer deception in the market, not the overt 
protection of an authors creativity, is the purpose of the Lanham 
 
 167 See id. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See Judgment of May 28, 1991, supra note 164. 
 170 See Netanel, supra note 33, at n.225 (stating that Even under French law . . . the 
directors exploitation rights are presumptively transferred to the producer.  But the director 
maintains certain moral rights despite the transfer.). 
 171 See Netanel, supra note 33, at 28. 
 172 See id. 
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Act.  Thus, authors garner protection only where overt mutilations 
occur to the extent that the character of the work is changed so as to 
present a false designation of origin.  Mutilation of a work, therefore, 
which does not confuse the publics view of its origin, would not be 
actionable under the Lanham Act.  As the Asphalt Jungle case 
exemplifies, this protection is quite limited relative to that afforded 
by other Berne Convention member countries. 
Is the United States really meeting its obligations under the Berne 
Convention, particularly in regards to Article 6bis?  To truly comply 
with the Berne Convention, it may be necessary for U.S. law to 
depart from its utilitarian, market-driven tradition, and to 
affirmatively provide protection to authors in a manner consistent 
with that provided by other member countries of the Berne 
Convention. 
 
